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Finally, in §6, we add a negation symbol to our language. With the appropriate negation, our example from §4 and §5 becomes a model of a paraconsistent set theory that validates all formulas from the negation-free fragment of ZF. We compare our paraconsistent set theory to other paraconsistent set theories from the literature and observe that it is fundamentally different from them.
We should like to mention that Joel Hamkins independently investigated the construction that is at the heart of this paper and proved a result equivalent to our Theorem 6.3 (presented at the Workshop on Paraconsistent Set Theory in Storrs, CT in October 2013). §2. Reasonable implication algebras.
Implication algebras and implication-negation algebras. In this paper, all structures (A, ∧, ∨, 0, 1) will be complete distributive lattices with smallest element 0 and largest element 1. As usual, we abbreviate x ∧ y = x as x ≤ y. An expansion of this structure by an additional binary operation ⇒ is called an implication algebra and an expansion with ⇒ and another unary operation * is called an implication-negation algebra. We emphasize that no requirements are made for ⇒ and * at this point.
Interpreting propositional logic in algebras. By L Prop we denote the language of propositional logic without negation (with connectives ∧, ∨, →, and ⊥ and countably many variables Var); we write L Prop,¬ for the expansion of this language to include the negation symbol ¬. Let L be either L Prop or L Prop,¬ , and let A be either an implication algebra or an implication-negation algebra, respectively. Any map ι from Var to A (called an assignment) allows us to interpret L-formulas ϕ as elements ι(ϕ) of the algebra. Par abus de langage, for an L-formula ϕ and some X ⊆ A, we write ϕ ∈ X for "for all assignments ι : Var → A, we have that ι(ϕ) ∈ X ". As usual, we call a set D ⊆ A a filter if the following four conditions hold: (i) 1 ∈ D, (ii) 0 / ∈ D, (iii) if x, y ∈ D, then x ∧ y ∈ D, and (iv) if x ∈ D and x ≤ y, then y ∈ D; in this context, we call filters designated sets of truth values, since the algebra A and a filter D together determine a logic A,D by defining for every set of L Prop -formulas and every L Prop -formula ϕ A,D ϕ : ⇐⇒ if for all ψ ∈ , we have ψ ∈ D, then ϕ ∈ D.
We write Pos A := {x ∈ A ; x = 0} for the set of positive elements in A. In all of the examples considered in this paper, this set will be a filter.
Reasonable implication algebras.
We call an implication algebra A = (A, ∧, ∨, 0, 1, ⇒) reasonable if the operation ⇒ satisfies the following axioms:
We say that a reasonable implication algebra is deductive if
It is easy to see that any reasonable implication algebra satisfies that x ≤ y implies x ⇒ y = 1. Similarly, it is easy to see that in reasonable and deductive implication algebras, we have (x ⇒ y) = (x ⇒ (x ∧ y)). These facts are being used in the calculations later in the paper. It is easy to check that all Boolean algebras and Heyting algebras are reasonable and deductive implication algebras.
Recurring examples. The following two examples will be crucial during the rest of the paper: The three-valued Łukasiewicz algebra Ł 3 = ({0, 1 /2, 1}, ∧, ∨, ⇒, 0, 1) with operations defined as in Figure 1 is a reasonable, but non-deductive implication algebra. The three-valued algebra PS 3 = ({0, 1 /2, 1}, ∧, ∨, ⇒, 0, 1) with operations defined as in Figure 2 is a reasonable and deductive implication algebra which is not a Heyting algebra. Let us emphasize that, contrary to usage in other papers, we consider Ł 3 and PS 3 as implication algebras without negation (cf. §6 for adding negations to PS 3 ). §3. The model construction.
Definitions and basic properties.
Our construction follows very closely the Boolean-valued construction as it can be found in Bell (2005) . We fix a model of set theory V and an implication algebra A = (A, ∧, ∨, 0, 1, ⇒) and construct a universe of names by transfinite recursion:
x is a function and ran(x) ⊆ A and there is ξ < α with dom(x) ⊆ V A ξ )} and V A = {x ; ∃α(x ∈ V A α )}. We note that this definition does not depend on the algebraic operations in A, but only on the set A, so any expansion of A to a richer language will give the same class of names V A . By L ∈ , we denote the first-order language of set theory using only the propositional connectives ∧, ∨, ⊥, and →. We can now expand this language by adding all of the (Bell, 2005 , Induction Principle 1.7), the (meta-)induction principle for V A can be proved by a simple induction on the rank function: for every property of names, if for all x ∈ V A , we have ∀y ∈ dom(x)( (y)) implies (x), then all names x ∈ V A have the property .
As in the Boolean case, we can now define a map · assigning to each negation-free formula in L A a truth value in A as follows. If u, v in V A and ϕ, ψ ∈ NFF, we define
As usual, we abbreviate ∃x(x ∈ u ∧ ϕ(x)) by ∃x ∈ u ϕ(x) and ∀x(x ∈ u → ϕ(x)) by ∀x ∈ u ϕ(x) and call these bounded quantifiers. Bounded quantifiers will play a crucial role in this paper.
If D is a filter on A and σ is a sentence of L A , we say that
In the Boolean-valued case, the names behave nicely with respect to their interpretations as names for sets. For instance, if two names denote the same object, then the properties of the object do not depend on the name you are using. In our generalized setting, we have to be very careful since many of these reasonable rules do not hold in general: cf. §4 for details.
PROPOSITION 3.1. If A is a reasonable implication algebra and u ∈ V A , we have that
Proof. This is an easy induction, using the fact that we have that in all reasonable implication algebras, x ≤ y implies x ⇒ y = 1.
However, things break down rather quickly if you go beyond Proposition 3.1. The inequality u = v ∧ v = w ≤ u = w representing transitivity of equality of names does not hold in general in the model constructed over Ł 3 : consider the functions p 0 = { ∅, 0 }, p1 /2 = { ∅, 1 /2 }, and
Then it can be easily checked that 
Proof. Easy calculation using Proposition 3.1.
In the Boolean case, the inequality proved in Proposition 3.2 is an equality (Bell, 2005, p. 23) :
This once more breaks down for general reasonable implication algebras: in V Ł 3 , we use the three names p 0 , p1 /2 , and p 1 defined above and consider the formula ϕ(x) := (x = p 0 ) as well as the name u = { p1 /2 , 1 /2 }. We can calculate
This means that in the setting of reasonable implication algebras, the following equality
becomes a new axiom, one whose validity depends on the choice of the formula ϕ and on A (and conceivably on the model of set theory V). If is any class of formulas of the extended language, we say that the pair (V, A) satisfies the -bounded quantification property, if BQ ϕ holds for every ϕ ∈ .
Set theory.
The axiom system ZF − consists of the axioms Extensionality, Pairing, Infinity, Union, and Power Set and the axiom schemes of Separation and Replacement. If add the axiom scheme of Foundation, we obtain ZF of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. For reference, we list the forms of the axioms and axiom schemes that we use in our proofs (in the schemes, ϕ is a formula with n + 2 free variables); the concrete formulations follows Bell (2005) very closely: We observe that all axioms and axiom schemes have natural forms that do not include any negation symbols, 2 so unless we instantiate one of the schemes with a formula containing a negation symbol, we will always have formulas in NFF. We write NFF-Separation and NFF-Replacement for the axiom schemes where we only allow the instantiation by negation-free formulas, and we write NFF-ZF − and NFF-ZF for negation-free set theory using these schemes. We emphasize once more that in settings where negation can be defined in terms of negation-free formulas (such as classical logic), this coincides (up to provable equivalence) with standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 are the core of this paper, establishing validity of NFF-ZF − in our A-valued model. Proof of Theorem 3.3. The proofs follow closely the proofs of the Boolean cases and only use the axioms of complete distributive lattices and the additional axioms P1, P2 and P3 of reasonable and deductive implication algebras (and their simple consequences such as "if x ≤ y, then x ⇒ y = 1", as mentioned above) and Proposition 3.1. Note that all of the calculations involve arguments with bounded quantifiers, relying on some equalities BQ ϕ . Inspection of the proofs shows that the formulas in the scope of the bounded quantifiers are negation-free. All of the axioms get value 1 in V A .
Proof of Theorem 3.4. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we inspect the details of the proofs in the Boolean case and observe that they only use the axioms of reasonable implication algebras, their simple consequences and BQ ϕ for ϕ ∈ NFF. The proof of Power Set uses x ⇒ y = x ⇒ (x ∧ y), as mentioned above. Again, all of the axioms get value 1 in V A . §4. Application, Part 1: The bounded quantification property in V PS 3 . The original intuition of Boolean-valued models was that the names represent objects and that the equivalence classes of names under the equivalence relation defined by u ∼ v if and only if u = v ∈ D can serve as the ontology of the new model. In particular, this means that if two names represent the same object, they should instantiate the same properties. This is known as "indiscernibility of identicals", one of the directions of Leibniz's Law. In our setting, we can represent this by a statement of the type
Unfortunately, it will turn out that these statements are not in general true in reasonable implication algebras and thus we have to be considerably more careful.
In this section (Theorem 4.5), we are going to prove the bounded quantification property for (V, PS 3 ). We start by making some algebraic observations about PS 3 : Since the truth table for the connective ⇒ does not contain the value 1 /2, we immediately know that for any u, v ∈ V PS 3 , the value of u = v will be either 0 or 1. Similarly, any formula with → as the outermost connective will be assigned value either 0 or 1. Furthermore, since all of the axioms of set theory except for Infinity are of the logical form Q where Q is a block of quantifiers and is a conjunction of implications, axioms of set theory can only get the values 0 and 1 as well. Also, we use that by the truth table for ∧, we have that any conjunction that gets the value 0 must have one conjunct that gets value 0; similarly, every disjunction that gets value 1 must have a disjunct that gets value 1.
PROPOSITION 4.1. For any three elements u, v, w ∈ V (PS 3 ) , we have
Proof. (1) We will prove u = v ∧ v = w ≤ u = w by induction on w: assume that for all z ∈ dom(w), we have
By the above remark, we know that all of the values are 0 or 1. If u = w = 1, then we have nothing to prove. Therefore, suppose Using Claim 4.2, we either have that there is some y 0 ∈ dom(v) with v(y 0 ) = 0 and y 0 ∈ w = 0 or for all such y 0 , we have x 0 = y 0 = 0. In the first case, we immediately calculate that v = w = 0. In the second case
and therefore u = v = 0. available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031400046X Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. UVA Universiteitsbibliotheek, on 09 Mar 2017 at 14:43:11, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, Case 2. Suppose z∈dom(w) w(z) ⇒ z ∈ u = 0. This case is proved analogously. Claim (2) in the statement of the proposition follows easily from (1):
Proposition 4.1 proves the instances of ( †) where ϕ(x) is x = w or x ∈ w for some fixed w, respectively. However, the case where ϕ(x) is w ∈ x is not valid in V PS 3 in general: let w ∈ V PS 3 be arbitrary and u and v with dom(u) = dom(v) = {w} defined by u(w) = 1 and v(w) = 1 /2. Then u = v = 1 = w ∈ u , but w ∈ v = 1 /2. PROPOSITION 4.3. For any three elements u, v, w ∈ V (PS 3 ) , we have the following:
Proof. Claims (1) and (2) are easy calculations using Proposition 4.1 and the axioms for reasonable implication algebras. Claim (3) is different, since we do not have the analogue of Proposition 4.1 for the formula w ∈ x (as seen above). As observed above, x = y will always take either the value 0 or the value 1. If u = v = 0, then both sides of the equation are 1, so we have nothing to prove. Thus, we can assume that u = v = 1. Checking the truth table for ⇒, we realize that (without loss of generality) we only need to exclude the case that w ∈ u = 0 and w ∈ v = 0.
So, let us assume that
We also assumed
If for all y ∈ dom(v), we have v(y) = 0, then w ∈ v = 0 and we are done, so we can assume that there is some y 0 such that v(y 0 ) = 0. Therefore, ( §) implies that
so there exists x 0 ∈ dom(u) such that u(x 0 ) = 0 = y 0 = x 0 , from which we get w = x 0 = 0 via (#). Proposition 4.1 gives w = y 0 ∧ y 0 = x 0 ≤ w = x 0 , thus w = y 0 = 0. This, together with v(y 0 ) = 0, gives w ∈ v = 0, and we are done.
THEOREM 4.4. If ϕ ∈ NFF, then for all u, v ∈ V PS 3 , we have Proof. This is proved by induction on the formula complexity. Proposition 4.3 provides the atomic cases. As before, we know that u = v is either 0 or 1. If it is 0, then the claim is obvious, so we can assume that u = v = 1. All cases are simple calculations using this assumption and the truth tables of the algebra PS 3 .
Theorem 4.4 is enough to establish the appropriate amount of the bounded quantification property that we need: THEOREM 4.5. The pair (V, PS 3 ) has the NFF-bounded quantification property.
Proof. We have to prove BQ ϕ for any negation-free formula ϕ, i.e., for any u ∈ V PS 3 , we need to show
First of all, an easy calculation using the properties of reasonable implication algebras and Theorem 4.4 shows that
For the other direction, take any x ∈ dom(u) and obtain
and hence, (u) u(x) ⇒ ϕ(x) . §5. Application, Part 2: Foundation in V PS 3 . In this section, we discuss the axiom scheme of Foundation (for which we do not have a general theorem along the lines of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4) and some related formulas such as ∃x(x ∈ x). Proof. We show Foundation in the form of ∈-induction: for every negation-free ϕ, we have that ∀x[∀y ∈ x ϕ(y) → ϕ(x)] → ∀xϕ(x) = 1.
Case 1. Suppose ϕ(x) = 0 for every x ∈ V PS 3 . Hence in this case ∀xϕ(x) ∈ { 1 /2, 1} and therefore by definition of ⇒,
available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031400046X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. UVA Universiteitsbibliotheek, on 09 Mar 2017 at 14:43:11, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, Case 2. Now let x ∈ V PS 3 with ϕ(x) = 0. Take a minimal u ∈ V PS 3 satisfying this, i.e., ϕ(u) = 0 but for any y ∈ dom(u); ϕ(y) = 0. Since there exist x ∈ V PS 3 for which ϕ(x) = 0, clearly ∀xϕ(x) = 0. Once more, the definition of ⇒ gives us:
Proof. The claim follows from Theorems 3.3, 3.4, 4.5, and 5.1.
Proof. By meta-induction, if there is a counterexample to the claim, there is a minimal counterexample, i.e., a name u with u ∈ u = 0, but for every x ∈ dom(u), we have that x ∈ x = 0. The first claim means that there is some x 0 ∈ dom(u) with u(x 0 ) = 0 and u = x 0 = 0. Since u = x 0 is defined in terms of a conjunction in which all expressions of the form u(x) ⇒ x ∈ x 0 for x ∈ dom(u) occur, each of these must be non-zero. Take one of these and let x = x 0 in this expression; we obtain u(x 0 ) ⇒ x 0 ∈ x 0 . But we assumed that u(x 0 ) = 0 and x 0 ∈ x 0 = 0. Contradiction! §6. Adding negation: A model of paraconsistent set theory.
The model construction. As mentioned in §3, the construction of the A-names does not depend on the algebraic structure at all, so if A is an implication algebra and A is an implication-negation algebra expanding it, they define the same class of names V A = V A . The language L A is then the closure of L A under negation, and we can now easily extend the map · to include all formulas in L A by adding the condition ¬ϕ := ϕ * . Negation and paraconsistency. Let A = (A, ∧, ∨, 0, 1, ⇒, * ) be an implicationnegation algebra and D a filter on A. We call the pair (A , D) paraconsistent if there are formulas ϕ and ψ such that {ϕ, ¬ϕ} A ,D ψ.
In the Boolean and Heyting cases, as well as in the algebras considered by Takeuti & Titani (1992) , Titani (1999) , Titani & Kozawa (2003 ), and Ozawa (2007 , 2009 , negation is defined in terms of implication via a * := a ⇒ 0. This definition, together with minimal requirements, makes it impossible to have paraconsistency. E.g., Titani (1999) requires that negation is defined in terms of negation by a * := a ⇒ 0 and, furthermore, (x ⇒ y) = 1 iff x ≤ y and that x ∧ (x ⇒ y) ≤ y. These three conditions together immediately imply that any such lattice with any filter D of designated truth values will not be paraconsistent in the above sense.
Adding a negation to PS 3 . If we expand PS 3 with a negation defined by 1 = 1 /2 = 0, and 0 = 1, then the results from §4 extend to give the bounded quantification property for all formulas (including negations) and Theorems 3.3, 5.1 and 3.4 extend to give full ZF available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175502031400046X Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. UVA Universiteitsbibliotheek, on 09 Mar 2017 at 14:43:11, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, in the resulting model. However, for none of the two possible filters D on PS 3 is the pair (PS 3 , D) paraconsistent, and the resulting logic (PS 3 , ),Pos PS 3 will just be classical logic. If, however, we supplement PS 3 with the negation * defined by 1 * = 0, 1 /2 * = 1 /2, and 0 * = 1, then (PS 3 , * , Pos PS 3 ) is paraconsistent, since 1 /2 * = 1 /2 ∈ D. 3 The positive results of §4 cannot be extended to (PS 3 , * ): consider the analogue of Theorem 4.4 for the formula ϕ(x) := ¬(w ∈ x). Again, we let w ∈ V PS 3 be an arbitrary name and u and v with dom(u) = dom(v) = {w} defined by u(w) = 1 and v(w) = 1 /2. We calculate u = v = 1, ϕ(u) = 0, and ϕ(v) = 1 /2. Therefore,
so the ϕ-instance of Theorem 4.4 is not valid in V PS 3 . This gives us the following result immediately:
Proof. We use u, v, w ∈ V PS 3 and ϕ(x) := ¬(w ∈ x) as in the above example. Define a name z := {(v, 1)}. We readily calculate ∀x(x ∈ z → ϕ(x)) = 0. But, on the other hand,
Paraconsistency in V (PS 3 , * ) and ontology of V (PS 3 , * ) . Exactly this phenomenon can now be used to show that the resulting set theory is paraconsistent: THEOREM 6.2. There is a sentence σ ∈ L ∈ such that both σ and ¬σ are Pos PS 3 -valid in
Proof. We use the three names u, v, and w from above: w ∈ V PS 3 is arbitrary and u and v with dom(u) = dom(v) = {w} defined by u(w) = 1 and v(w) = 1 /2. These three names witness that the sentence
has value 1 /2, and thus both σ and ¬σ are Pos PS 3 -valid.
Corollary 5.2 and Theorem 6.2 together show that V (PS 3 , * ) is a model of set theory with paraconsistent phenomena, in short, a model of paraconsistent set theory. As in the Boolean-valued case, the algebra-valued construction does not produce a model of a set theory in the standard sense of ordinary model theory. As discussed in §4, the natural approach here would be consider the ∼-equivalence classes of names as objects where u ∼ v if and only if u = v ∈ D. 4 Due to the proof of Theorem 6.1, we cannot expect that (the scheme of) Leibniz's Law
holds for arbitrary formulas (even though we proved the negation-free fragment of Leibniz's Law in Theorem 4.4).
Not all formulas defining a unique object in ordinary set theory do so in our model: e.g., the formula N (x) := ∀z(z / ∈ x) usually uniquely defines the empty set, but in V (PS 3 , * ) , the formula N (x) is valid if and only if x is a name such that ran(x) ⊆ {0, 1 /2}. Now let u be such a name with ran(u) ⊆ {0} and v be such a name with 1 /2 ∈ ran(u). Then
In particular, the class of names x such that N (x) does not form a ∼-equivalence class. 5 We can modify the formula N to N (x) := ∀y∀z(x = y → z / ∈ y) which is classically equivalent to N (x). Then it is easy to see that for a name x, the formula N (x) is valid if and only if ran(x) ⊆ {0}, and this class forms a ∼-equivalence class: the class is thus is a good candidate for the ontology of the empty set in V (PS 3 ,  *  ) .
And yet, the failure of Leibniz's Law affects these concrete mathematical objects as well, as can be seen by applying the proof of Theorem 6.2: Define E(x) := ∃e( N (e) ∧ ∀z(z ∈ x ↔ z = e)); this is the canonical formula defining the von Neumann ordinal one. We observe that the class of names x such that E(x) is valid forms a ∼-equivalence class, and thus is a good candidate for the ontology of the von Neumann ordinal one. However, this equivalence class contains names of different nature: let w be any name such that N (w) is valid, and let u = {(w, 1)} and v = {(w, 1 /2)}. Then E(u) = 1 and E(v) = 1 /2, so both u and v are names for the von Neumann ordinal one. However,
so the truth value of the statement "zero is both an element of one and not an element of one" depends on which name for one is chosen. A first discussion of the behaviour of von Neumann ordinals in V (PS 3 , * ) can be found in Tarafder (2015) .
Comparison to other paraconsistent set theories. Paraconsistent set theories have been studied by many authors (Brady, 1971; Brady & Routley, 1989; Restall, 1992; Libert, 2005; Weber, 2010a Weber, ,b, 2013 ; all of these accounts start from the observation that ZF was created to avoid the contradiction that can be obtained from the axiom scheme of Comprehension ∃x∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ϕ(y)) via Russell's paradox. Arguing that contradictions are not necessarily devastating in a paraconsistent setting, these authors reinstate the axiom scheme of Comprehension as acceptable, allow the formation of the Russell set R, and conclude that both R ∈ R and R / ∈ R are true. Our paraconsistent set theory behaves very differently from the considerations of paraconsistent set theory in the mentioned papers, as we can show that the axiom scheme of Comprehension is not valid in our model: THEOREM 6.3. If (PS 3 , Pos PS 3 ), we have ∃x∀y(y ∈ x) = 0. Since this formula is an instance of Comprehension, the axiom scheme of Comprehension is not Pos PS 3 -valid in V (PS 3 , * ) .
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 5.3: if ∃x∀y(y ∈ x) = 0 and u is a name witnessing this (i.e., ∀y(y ∈ u) = 0), then u ∈ u = 0 in contradiction to Theorem 5.3. THEOREM 6.4. In (PS 3 , * , Pos PS 3 ), we have ∃x∀y(y ∈ x ↔ y / ∈ y) = 0. This means that there is no Russell set.
Proof. Again, assume towards a contradiction that u satisfies ∀y(y ∈ u ↔ y / ∈ y) = 0. By Theorem 5.3, y / ∈ y = y ∈ y * = 0 * = 1 for all y and u ∈ u = 0. But then u / ∈ u → u ∈ u = 0. Contradiction!
